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Abstract 
 
This article examines the link between restrictive immigration schemes, specifically ‘tied visas’ and the selective 
application of labour laws, with exploitation of workers. It focuses on the situation of migrant domestic workers, 
who accompany their employers to the United Kingdom (UK) and are exposed to both an excessively restrictive visa 
regime, introduced in April 2012, and limited labour protections. The immigration status of these workers is 
currently tied to a named employer, a restriction that traps workers into exploitative conditions, often amounting to 
forced labour, servitude or slavery. Additionally, current UK labour laws are either not enforced or not applicable to 
domestic workers. The article concludes that unless the current immigration regime is abolished and comprehensive 
labour law protections are extended to migrant domestic workers, exploitation will continue.  
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'Visados atados' y protecciones de trabajo inadecuadas: una 
fórmula para el abuso y la explotación de las/os 
trabajadoras/os domésticas/os migrantes en el Reino Unido. 
 
Daphne Demetriou 
 
Resumen 
 
Este artículo examina el nexo entre los sistemas restrictivos de inmigración, específicamente los 'visados atados' y la 
aplicación selectiva de las leyes laborales, con la explotación de las/os trabajadoras/os. Se centra en la situación de 
las/os trabajadoras/os domésticas/os migrantes, que acompañan a sus empleadores al Reino Unido (UK) y que 
están expuestas/os tanto a un régimen excesivamente restrictivo de visados (introducido en abril de 2012) como a 
limitadas  protecciones laborales. El estatus migratorio de estas personas está ligado actualmente a un empresario 
concreto, una restricción que atrapa a las/os trabajadoras/os en condiciones de explotación, a menudo equivalente al 
trabajo forzoso, la servidumbre o la esclavitud. Además, las actuales leyes laborales del Reino Unido o no se hacen 
cumplir, o bien no son aplicables a las/os trabajadoras/es domésticas/os. El artículo concluye que, a menos que el 
régimen actual de inmigración sea abolido y las protecciones integrales del derecho laboral se extienden a las/os 
trabajadoras/es domésticas/os migrantes, la explotación continuará. 
 
Palabras clave: trabajadoras/es domésticas/os, ley de inmigración, sistema Kafala, ley laboral, explotación. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The abuse and exploitation endured by many migrant domestic workers globally is well documented and can often 
reach levels of forced labour, servitude or slavery.1 This article does not attempt to map all instances and forms of 
exploitation; its aim is to examine how immigration and labour regimes contribute to such abuse. Reports 
concentrating on the UK and various Arab States, which are the focus of this article, include migrant domestic 
workers’ accounts of physical, sexual and psychological abuse.2 Many have had their passports confiscated and are 
prevented from leaving the place of employment unaccompanied.3 Domestic workers report working excessive 
hours often for minimal, if any, salary.4 Such conditions put the physical health and safety of workers at great risk, 
emphasising the need for protecting their rights. 
 
This article does not claim that in the absence of restrictive immigration and labour regimes migrant domestic 
workers are not at risk of exploitation. Indeed, a number of intrinsic characteristics of domestic work enable 
exploitation to flourish. Nevertheless, what makes the situation in the UK particularly severe is that the present 
immigration and labour regimes applicable to migrant domestic workers facilitate and enhance such abuse, elevating 
it from individual abuse on the part of the employers to institutionalised exploitation.5  
 
When examining restrictive immigration regimes, the article looks at the Kafala system, which has received great 
censure, and compares it to the current UK migrant domestic worker visa. Relevant UK immigration rules are 
examined, together with parliamentary and non-governmental organization (NGO) reports on the current visa and 
its effects. A number of core UK labour law provisions are reviewed in an attempt to demonstrate how domestic 
workers are, implicitly or explicitly, excluded from key protections. Finally, the article seeks to identify means of 
enhancing the protection of migrant domestic workers’ rights to freedom from abuse and exploitation. 
 
Domestic Workers: Characteristics and vulnerabilities 
According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), domestic work is ‘work performed in or for a household 
or households.’6 The prominence of domestic work worldwide is evident by recent ILO estimates, surmising that 
between 1995–2010 the global number of domestic workers has risen from approximately 33.2 million to 52.6 
million. 7  Domestic work is a female-dominated sector, with women accounting for 83% of domestic workers 
worldwide.8 Even though an exact percentage cannot be obtained due to data limitations, a high percentage of 
female domestic workers are migrants.9 This supports the view that there has been a trend towards the ‘feminisation 
of migration’,10 with many women from less developed countries now moving to more developed countries in order 
to take employment as domestic workers. Recent research on the ‘feminisation of migration’ moves away from the 
initial focus on wives and children migrating to join earlier waves of male migrants, and looks at women as 
                                                          
1  Organization for Security and Co-ordination in Europe (OSCE) Office of the Special Representative and Coordinator for 
Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, ‘Unprotected Work, Invisible Exploitation: Trafficking for the purpose of domestic 
servitude’, OSCE, 2010; P Smales, ‘The New Slave in the Kitchen: Debt bondage and women migrant domestic workers in 
Asia’, Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development, 2011. 
2  R Begum, ‘“I Already Bought You”: Abuse and exploitation of female migrant domestic workers in the United Arab 
Emirates’, Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2014, pp. 32–33; Kalayaan, ‘Still Enslaved: The migrant domestic workers who are 
trapped by the immigration rules’, Kalayaan, 2014, retrieved 5 January 2015, http://www.kalayaan.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/tied-visa-20141.pdf; HRW, ‘“As If I Am Not Human” Abuses against Asian domestic workers in 
Saudi Arabia’, HRW, 2008, p. 69. 
3  V Mantouvalou, ‘Overseas Domestic Workers: Britain’s domestic slaves’, Socialist Lawyer, no. 69, 2015, p. 44. 
4  I Leghtas, ‘Hidden Away: Abuses against migrant domestic workers in the UK’, HRW, 2014,  pp. 33–35; Begum, pp.36–38; 
Kalayaan, ‘Britain’s Forgotten Slaves; Migrant domestic workers in the UK three years after the introduction of the tied 
Overseas Domestic Worker visa’, Kalayaan, 2015, retrieved 26 June 2015, http://www.kalayaan.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/Kalayaan-3-year-briefing.pdf 
5  House of Lords/House of Commons, ‘Report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Modern Slavery Bill’ (Session 2013-14, 
HL Paper 166, HC 1019), para. 225. 
6  ILO C189, Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (N. 189), Convention concerning decent work for domestic workers, 16 June 2011, Article 1 
(Domestic Workers Convention).  
7  ILO, ‘Domestic Workers Across the World: Global and regional statistics and the extent of legal protections’, International 
Labour Office, 2013, p. 24. 
8  Ibid., pp. 19, 21.  
9  Ibid., pp. 24, 39. 
10  See N Piper, ‘Feminisation of Migration and the Social Dimensions of Development: The Asian case’, Third World Quarterly, 
vol. 29, issue 7, 2008; A Hochschild, ‘Love and Gold’ in B Ehrenreich and A Hochschild (eds.), Global Woman: Nannies, maids 
and sex workers in the new economy, Granta, 2003, p. 17  
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independent labour migrants. 11  As Beneria, Deere and Kabeer observe, ‘profound transformations [have been 
witnessed] in the structure of families and gender roles in the international division of labor’;12 with female migrants 
constituting ‘a mighty but silent river’ in the migration reality.13 
 
Contrary to men however, migrant women enter a market that is often left in the informal economy with 
limited protections for the worker. Entrenched gender discrimination affects the social, economic and 
political rights of women in their home countries, limiting their educational and employment 
opportunities.14 As Satterthwaite notes, the feminisation of migration is driven by a number of ‘worldwide 
forces in which gender roles and sex discrimination are intertwined with globalization’.15 Thus, while 
migrant men are given the opportunity to enter both low and high-skilled jobs, commonly part of the 
formal economy, women are often restricted to a finite range of female-dominated occupations, rooted 
within traditional gender perceptions often placing the woman in the home.  
 
The article’s focus on migrant domestic workers is based on the increased precariousness and vulnerability of their 
situation, due to restrictive immigration schemes. The use of the terms ‘precariousness’ and ‘vulnerability’ is 
intentional, as explained below, and both terms have academic precedent in research on migrant domestic workers.16  
 
Elements identified as determining whether an employment relationship is a precarious one include the control the 
worker has over the labour process, for example over the working conditions and the wages; the degree of certainty 
as to the continuance of the employment; the regulatory protection available for the particular employment sector; 
and the income level of the employment.17 The majority of these elements are directly linked to state policies and 
laws, and as this article demonstrates the UK government has contributed to the creation and maintenance of such 
precarious employment relationships.  
 
Vulnerable workers have been defined as individuals ‘who are at risk of having their workplace entitlements denied, 
and who lack the capacity or means to secure them.’18 Under this definition, it is clear that vulnerability can be both 
the result of precarious employment, due for example to the lack of labour law protections, and the result of 
characteristics of the particular individuals and labour sectors that may hinder their protection.  
 
Anderson asserts that the term ‘precariousness’ is more suitable for describing the situation of domestic work and 
domestic workers than the term ‘vulnerability’ as the latter risks ‘naturalising these conditions and confining those 
workers so affected to victimhood.’19 Yet, by referring to domestic workers as ‘vulnerable’, the author does not claim 
that this is an inherent characteristic of the particular persons, but as Satterthwaite notes, vulnerability is ‘the product 
of political, economic, and cultural forces acting along a variety of identity axes, including gender, race, and 
nationality, that disempower specific sets of women in particular ways.’20 ‘Precariousness’ does not fully capture the 
dangerous situation in which individuals often find themselves. Precarious employment can simply refer to non-
standard work.21 Such flexible employment can often be the conscious choice of the worker and the most beneficial 
one in meeting his or her needs and obligations during a particular period. Notably, flexible and secure employment 
                                                          
11  E Hofmann and C Buckley, ‘Global Changes and Gendered Responses: The feminization of migration from Georgia’, 
International Migration Review, vol. 47, issue 3, 2013, p. 510.  
12  L Beneria, C Deere and N Kabeer, ‘Gender and International Migration: Globalization, development and governance’ in L 
Oso and N Ribas-Mateos (eds.), The International Handbook on Gender, Migration and Transnationalism: Global developlment 
perspectives, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2013, p. 45. 
13  United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), ‘State of World Population 2006: A passage to hope–Women and International 
migration’, UNFPA, 2006, p.21. 
14  OSCE Office of the Special Representative and Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, ‘Combating 
Trafficking as Modern-Day Slavery: A matter of non-discrimination and empowerment’, OSCE, 2012, p. 51. 
15  M Satterthwaite, ‘Using human rights law to empower migrant domestic workers in the inter-American system’ in N Piper 
(ed.), New Perspectives on Gender and Migration: livelihood, rights and entitlements, Routledge, Oxon, 2008, p. 278.  
16  V Mantouvalou, ‘Human Rights for Precarious Workers: The legislative precariousness of domestic labour’, Comparative Labor 
Law and Policy Journal, vol. 34, issue 1, 2012, pp.133–166; J Fudge and R Owens, ‘Precarious Work, Women and the New 
Economy: The challenge to legal norms’ in J Fudge and R Owens (eds.), Precarious Work, Women and the New Economy, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2006, p. 10.  
17  G Rodgers, ‘Precarious Work in Western Europe: The state of the debate’ in G Rodgers and J Rodgers (eds.), Precarious Jobs in 
Labour Market Regulation: The growth of atypical employment in Western Europe, ILO, Geneva, 1989, p. 3. 
18  Health and Safety Executive (HSE), ‘Vulnerable Workers’, HSE, retrieved 27 January 2015, 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/vulnerable-workers/  
19  B Anderson, ‘Migration, Immigration Controls and the Fashioning of Precarious Workers’, Work, Employment & Society, vol. 
24, no. 10, 2010, p. 303.  
20  M Satterthwaite, p. 286. 
21  M Ori and M Sargeant, ‘Introduction’ in T Fashoyin and M Tiraboschi (eds.), Vulnerable Workers and Precarious Working, 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 2013. 
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has been strongly advocated by the European Commission through its ‘Flexicure’ strategy.22 Accordingly, describing 
the situation of migrant domestic workers as merely precarious—a term commonly understood as flexible, non-
standard work—runs the risk of trivialising such workers’ situation. It is vital for policy and legislative changes, but 
also for the mobilisation of civil society, to display the true picture of migrant domestic workers; that is of vulnerable 
workers in precarious employment. 
 
Before examining how restrictive immigration regimes and inadequate labour protections generate or maintain the 
exploitation of migrant domestic workers, it is important to look at some inherent aspects of domestic work that can 
automatically place them in a vulnerable position. While the current UK immigration regime does not stipulate that 
domestic workers must live in the same dwelling as their employer, the majority of workers live-in, 23  as the 
alternative requires either the employer to pay for the worker’s accommodation, or the latter’s wage to be sufficient 
to cover this expense.24 The private nature of domestic workers’ employment and living environment renders its 
regulation challenging. The workers’ isolation further limits their access to information and assistance. 25  The 
longstanding principle of the inviolability of the private home conflicts with state aims to regulate labour, confining 
domestic work to the shadows and allowing abuse to occur undetected. This is evidenced for example by the 
reluctance of states, including the UK, to apply to domestic work the same rules on labour inspection as applied to 
other labour sectors. 26  Importantly, the conflation of the workers’ workplace with the home can enhance the 
intimacy between the two parties and reinforce the view of a paternalistic or familial relationship.27 This presumed 
‘labour of love’28 is often used to justify the worker undertaking more tasks and working longer hours in order to 
please the ‘considerate employer’.29  
 
One may argue that this highly personalised and dependent relationship between the employer and the domestic 
worker is unavoidable with live-in domestic work and therefore exposure to exploitation cannot be attributed to 
state-imposed policies and laws. Nevertheless, the very fact that this employment is already a precarious one makes 
regulation and labour protection imperative.  
 
Migrant Domestic Workers under the Kafala system  
Strikingly similar to the current UK immigration regime, the Kafala system is an immigration scheme for low-skilled 
migrant workers, including domestic workers, applied in a number of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, as 
well as in Jordan and Lebanon.30 The term Kafala literally translates to ‘surety, bail, guarantee, responsibility or 
amenability’.31 This portrayal of responsibility and guardianship is echoed in the usage of the term when applied to 
the regulation of the employer-low-skilled migrant worker relationship.  
 
The way in which the Kafala system is implemented varies.32 While for example in the GCC countries all migrant 
workers are subject to the Kafala system, in Lebanon it is utilised for low-skilled workers coming primarily from 
Africa and Asia, but not for those from Syria.33 Nonetheless, for the purposes of this article, the main element of this 
system, which is also present in the current UK visa system, can be identified throughout. Therefore this section 
does not focus on a particular form of Kafala, but rather on the negative effects of this all-encompassing immigration 
system. 
                                                          
22  European Commission (EC), ‘Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, “Flexicure”’, EC, retrieved 24 June 2015, 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=102&langId=en 
23  Kalayaan, ‘Britain’s Forgotten Slaves’. 
24  UK Visas and Immigration, ‘Guidance: Overseas domestic workers in private households: WRK2.1’, UK Visas and 
Immigration, retrieved 29 June 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overseas-domestic-workers-in-private-
households-wrk21/overseas-domestic-workers-in-private-households-wrk21--2#wrk216-maintenance-and-accommodation 
25  OSCE, ‘Unprotected Work, Invisible Exploitation’, p.15 
26  Thomson Reuters Foundation for the Trust Women Conference, ‘A Landscape Analysis of Domestic Workers’ Rights and 
ILO Convention 189’, Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2012. 
27  V Mantouvalou, ‘The Many Faces of Slavery: The example of domestic work’, Global Dialogue, vol. 14, no. 2, 2012, retrieved 1 
February 2015, http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=536 
28  M Romero, Maid in the U.S.A., Routledge, New York, 1992. 
29  ILO, ‘Report IV(1): Decent work for domestic workers’, International Labour Office, 2010,  p.12. 
30  Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA), ‘Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala (Sponsorship) System’, MFA, 2012, retrieved 22 July 
2015, http://www.mfasia.org/resources/publications/464-mfa-policy-briefs 
31  A Abikan, ‘Contract of Kafalah (Guarantee): A veritable product of Islamic financing?’, University of Ilorin Law Journal, 3 and 4, 
2008, p. 200. 
32  S Roper and L Barria, ‘Understanding Variations in Gulf Migration and Labor Practices’, Middle East Law and Governance, vol. 
6, 2014. 
33  K Azfar and H Harroff-Tavel, ‘Reforming the Kafala: Challenges and opportunities in moving forward’, Paper presented at 
‘Strengthening Dialogue to Make Migration Work for Development in the ESCAP and ESCWA Regions’, Beirut, 2011, p. 
294. 
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In order for migrant workers to receive an entry visa under the Kafala system, a citizen or institution of that state 
must employ them and the worker can only work for that sponsor during her stay. The employer assumes full 
economic and legal responsibility for the worker.34 Under Saudi Arabia’s Kafala system for example, the employer 
‘bears the responsibility for the worker’s recruitment fees, completion of medical exams, and possession of an iqama, 
or national identity card.’35 The most controversial aspect of this scheme, found in all Kafala-supportive states, is the 
fact that the worker’s residency permit is dependent on her continued employment by the named sponsor, a feature 
that ‘ties’ the employee to her employer. Therefore, in order for workers to change employment or leave the country, 
they must receive an‘exit visa’ from their sponsor.36  
 
While the sponsorship arrangement is beneficial for the respective state, as it enables it ‘to regulate labor flow…and 
monitor worker activities to mitigate security concerns’,37 this regime has proved extremely detrimental for migrant 
domestic workers. As the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants noted, ‘[t]he Kafala system enables 
unscrupulous employers to exploit employees.’38 This form of dependency is multifaceted, consisting of a legal, 
economical and livelihood dependency on the employer. The legal dependency alone greatly enhances an already 
vulnerable position as fear of arrest and deportation come into play and affect the worker’s decision to flee and 
report an abusive situation. Accordingly, as the ILO Committee of Experts has noted, Kafala can be conducive to the 
exaction of forced labour.39  
 
A 2014 report on the relation of the Kafala system to labour bondage in GCC countries provides a glimpse of the 
effects this system can have on workers. Some of the common forms of abuse recorded in Gulf countries include: 
 
[N]onpayment or underpayment of wages, confiscation of passports, inadequate living conditions, 
long working hours, agency fees and recruitment violations, contract substitution and restricted or no 
freedom of movement, physical, sexual or emotional abuse…40 
 
The control granted to employers over migrant workers under the Kafala system has been enhanced by the adoption 
of a number of additional laws. One such law is the crime of ‘absconding’. In Kuwait for example, as soon as the 
worker is reported missing, police can cancel her residency permit and register an order for her detention and 
deportation.
41
 In Saudi Arabia, it has been reported that an estimated 20,000 migrant domestic workers ‘abscond’ 
from their employers on an annual basis.
42
 As the workers’ legal status is tied to their employer, once they flee, they 
automatically become undocumented. The potential effects of such ‘absconding laws’ can result in many workers 
choosing to work under the radar, which can expose them to a greater risk of exploitation. As Naufal’s and Malit’s 
qualitative interviews reveal, due to their undocumented status, many domestic workers struggle to bargain for higher 
wages, and the absence of an employment contract leads to their labour rights being disregarded with impunity.
43
  
 
Promises have been made by many Kafala-supportive states to abolish this restrictive immigration regime, yet 
nominal action has been taken.44 Notably, in 2009 Bahrain passed a new law seemingly abolishing this system, 
allowing migrant workers to change employers.45 Nevertheless, a subsequent law introduced in 2011 undermined this 
reform, stipulating that the worker needs to remain with the same employer for a year before being legally allowed to 
                                                          
34  Roper and Barria, p. 34. 
35  HRW, ‘As if I am Not Human’, p. 26.  
36  Ibid. 
37  Roper and Barria, p. 34. 
38  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, F Crépeau, ‘Addendum Mission to Qatar’, para. 25. 
39  ILO, ‘Giving Globalization a Human Face: General survey on the fundamental Conventions concerning rights at work in 
light of the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, 2008, Report III(1B)’, International Labour 
Conference, 101st Session, Geneva, 2012, pp. 126–27. 
40  Asia Pacific Mission for Migrants, ‘The Kafala: Research on the impact and relation of the sponsorship system to migrant 
labor bondage in GCC countries’, APMM, 2014, p. 29. 
41  HRW, ‘Walls at Every Turn: Abuse of migrant domestic workers through Kuwait’s sponsorship system’, HRW, 2010, p.8. 
42  K Nikolas, ‘Saudi proposal to fine runaway workers’, Digital Journal, 2 March 2012, retrieved 2 February 2015, 
http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/320532 
43  F Malit and G Naufal, ‘Asymmetric Information under the Kafala Sponsorship System: Impacts on foreign domestic workers’ 
income and employment status in the GCC Countries’, Cornell University ILR School, Working Paper, 21 October 2014, p.17, 
retrieved 1 February 2015, http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1177&context=workingpapers 
44  HRW, ‘Saudi Arabia: A step to aid migrant workers’, HRW, 10 April 2012, retrieved 2 February 2015, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/10/saudi-arabia-step-aid-migrant-workers; Ministry of the Interior, ‘Qatar announces 
wide-ranging labour market reforms’,  Ministry of the Interior, 2014, retrieved, 3 February 2015, 
http://www.moi.gov.qa/site/english/news/2014/05/14/32204.html 
45  Decision No. (79) for 2009 Regarding the mobility of foreign employee from one employer to another. 
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change employers.46  
 
According to the international community, Kafala is a system that has failed time and again.47 Not only domestic 
workers, but also many others entering states under this system, experience its negative impact. Recent criticism has 
focused on labour exploitation of migrant workers entering Qatar to work on 2022 World Cup projects. 48 
Accordingly, one would reasonably assume, that a system that has been shown as unequivocally failing to uphold 
basic labour and human rights of migrant workers is a system to denounce, or at a minimum one to avoid. 
Nevertheless, while GCC states can be seen taking steps, at least on paper, towards the abolition of this system, the 
UK chose to ignore the condemnation of the international community and in April 2012 commenced tying migrant 
domestic workers to their employers. 
 
Domestic Workers in a Private Household Visa: Kafala by a different name? 
 
To appreciate fully the potential impact of the current UK immigration regime for migrant domestic workers it is 
important to examine the previous visa regime: the ‘1998 visa’.49 In order for domestic workers to enter the UK 
under the 1998 visa they had to prove themselves as an established member of their employer’s staff. They were 
given permission to stay for a fixed period of twelve months towards the end of which they either had to leave the 
country or apply for an extension. The extension would allow them to stay and work as domestic workers for 
another twelve months, at the end of which they could make another application for extension. After five years of 
continuous employment as domestic workers, they could apply for settlement. The most important aspect of this 
visa was that workers were allowed to change employers, at any point during their initial or extended twelve months, 
as long as they remained in employment as domestic workers.50  
 
The ability to change employers provided workers both with an exit option when experiencing exploitation, and with 
greater bargaining power against employers, who did not control their legal status, a power that gave unscrupulous 
employers a false sense of proprietorship over domestic workers. Nevertheless, this regime, which has been 
described as a best practice,51 is now merely a past glory as this visa was repealed in April 2012.  
 
Under the new immigration rules, domestic workers, excluding those who had already been granted a visa under the 
former regime, can only enter the UK if accompanied by their overseas employer or the employer’s spouse or child 
who is visiting the UK. Workers must now leave the UK when their employer leaves, and at a maximum six months 
after arrival. The new rules remove the possibility of applying for settlement. Most importantly, migrant domestic 
workers are no longer allowed to change employers.52 
 
The government asserted that such a change was necessary to bring immigration rules in line with the UK policy of 
reducing net migration and focusing on the ‘brightest and best’ migrants. 53 Yet, despite pledges to reduce net 
migration from the hundreds of thousands to the tens of thousands,54 estimates of net migration for 2014 were at 
318,000, a significant increase from the 209,000 in 2013.55 These figures therefore rebut any attempt to justify this 
drastic and harmful visa change for domestic workers. The visa’s sole detectable impact has been, as demonstrated in 
this article, the creation of a workforce highly vulnerable to exploitation. 
 
                                                          
46  Bahrain News Agency, ‘HM King Hamad Issues Law 15/2011', Bahrain News Agency, retrieved 2 February 2015, 
http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/461096 
47  F Crépeau, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Addendum Mission to Qatar’, Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 2014. 
48  P Pattisson, ‘Revealed: Qatar’s World Cup “slaves”, The Guardian, 25 September 2013, retrieved 1 February 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/25/revealed-qatars-world-cup-slaves 
49  Immigration Rules, Part 5, HC 395 of 1993-4 as amended by CM 5597 of 22 August 2002. 
50 UK Border Agency (UKBA), ‘Domestic Workers’, retrieved 25 June 2015, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140110181512/;http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/workingintheuk/otherca
tegories/domesticworkers/ 
51  J A Bustamante, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Jorge Bustamante—Addendum—
Mission to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’, OHCHR, 2010, para. 60. 
52  M Gower, ‘Immigration: Migrant domestic workers’, House of Commons Library, Home Affairs Section, SN/HA/4786, 20 
March 2012, p.7. 
53  Press Release, ‘British Prime Minister David Cameron Delivers Major Speech on Immigration Policy’, retrieved 28 June 2015,  
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-prime-minister-david-cameron-delivers-major-speech-on-immigration-policy 
54  Prime Minister David Cameron’s Speech on Immigration, 10 October 2011, retrieved 26 June 2015, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-on-immigration 
55  Office for National Statistics, ‘Migration Statistics Quarterly Report, May 2015’, retrieved 26 May 2015, 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/migration1/migration-statistics-quarterly-report/may-2015/stb-msqr-may-2015.html  
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In an attempt to quell the objections to the new visa, the government introduced ‘safeguards’ in the form of 
eligibility criteria. Specifically, for migrant domestic workers to enter the UK written evidence must be provided that 
they have worked for their employer for at least twelve months prior to their arrival. Furthermore, before arriving in 
the UK, a contract of employment setting out the terms and conditions agreed between the parties needs to be 
presented. Finally, Home Office officials have been tasked with disseminating information to all workers applying 
for this visa, delineating their rights in the UK.56  
 
Such measures could in theory contribute to the reduction of migrant domestic workers’ vulnerability to exploitation; 
evidence indicates however, that the government is failing to implement these safeguards.57 The requirement that a 
worker has worked for the employer for at least twelve months prior to arrival does not constitute a new safeguard, 
but was already an eligibility requirement under the 1998 visa.58 In any event, this requirement is not a guarantee that 
the worker is not in an already abusive employment relationship. Indeed, according to Mantouvalou, who conducted 
interviews with migrant domestic workers who arrived in the UK under the tied visa, many reported that their 
working conditions prior to arrival were already very poor. The interviewees reported working between twelve and 
twenty hours a day, with no day off, and almost all reported not being allowed to leave the house unaccompanied. 
Notably, some reported physical, sexual and psychological abuse.59 Such grave exploitation, often amounting to 
forced labour, servitude or slavery, exacerbated by the fear of deportation, can and has been reported to result in 
physically and/or psychologically trapped individuals who will either endure the abuse or become undocumented, 
rather than going to the authorities.60  
 
Additionally, measures such as the delineation of contract terms and rights-awareness ought to be applied regardless 
of the workers’ visa type. These constitute basic safeguards against exploitation and should be standard practice, 
rather than being presented as a proactive and innovative method conceived by the government for protecting these 
individuals. Importantly, there is no guarantee that the contracts presented are legitimate or that the terms delineated 
within them will be respected once the visa is granted. Domestic workers confirmed the non-implementation of 
contracts during interviews with Mantouvalou. 61  As the next section demonstrates, the situation is further 
exacerbated with the exclusion of migrant domestic workers from numerous labour law protections.  
 
There has been widespread criticism of this new visa. Kalayaan, a UK-based NGO working to provide advice and 
support to migrant domestic workers, insisted that such a regime would increase the instances of human 
trafficking.62 One of the arguments posited by the government in an attempt to placate such fears, is that the 
National Referral Mechanism (NRM) exists to identify and support victims of trafficking.63 While such a mechanism 
is important, it does not constitute a prophylactic approach, but simply an ex post facto measure, confirming the very 
fact that this visa exposes individuals to exploitation. Furthermore, the current NRM is flawed, partly because the 
UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI), one of the bodies responsible for identifying trafficking victims, is also 
responsible for deporting undocumented migrants. It therefore follows that numerous workers registered with 
Kalayaan, whose situations display human trafficking characteristics, do not wish to be referred to the NRM.64  
 
The anticipated effects of the new visa regime have been and continue to be realised. In a May 2015 report, Kalayaan 
found that in the three years since the introduction of the tied visa, the level of abuse reported has been consistently 
higher than under the 1998 visa. In particular, domestic workers reported that 14% of those tied to their employers 
were physically abused, as opposed to 9% of those under the old visa; 66% of workers on the current visa reported 
being prevented from leaving the house freely, compared to 41% of workers previously; 81% of those on the tied 
visa reported having no time off compared to 66% of those under the 1998 visa; 31% of those on the current visa 
                                                          
56  Home Office, ‘Statement of Intent: Changes to Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 5 of the Points Based System; Overseas Domestic 
Workers; and Visitors’, 2012. 
57  Written evidence submitted by Dr Virginia Mantouvalou on the Modern Slavery Bill, prepared 15 October 2014, retrieved 28 
November 2014,  
 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmpublic/modernslavery/memo/ms28.htm 
58 UKBA, ‘Domestic Workers, Eligibility’, retrieved 23 June 2015, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140110181512/http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/workingintheuk/othercat
egories/domesticworkers/eligibility/ 
59  V Mantouvalou, ‘Overseas Domestic Workers: Britain’s domestic slaves’, p. 42. 
60  Ibid., p. 43. 
61  Ibid., pp. 42–43. 
62  Kalayaan, ‘Response on Consultation: Migrant domestic workers’, p. 3, retrieved 23 October 2014, 
http://www.kalayaan.org.uk/documents/Kalayaan%20full%20response%20to%20consultation%20(final).pdf 
63  Home Office, ‘Impact Assessment Changes to Tier 5 of the Points Based System and Overseas Domestic Worker routes of 
entry’, IAHO0053, 15 March 2012, p.17, retrieved 1 February 2015,  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/117958/impact-assessment.pdf 
64  Kalayaan, ‘Still enslaved’. 
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reported not being paid at all, compared to 11% under the old visa; and 74% of those on the tied visa had their 
passports withheld, compared to 50% under the 1998 visa.65  
 
A 2013 report on modern slavery also highlighted the negative effects of the current visa regime and the need for its 
abolition. It noted that this regime ‘presents serious risks that the informal and unregulated nature of this form of 
work will increase, disempowering workers through restricting their freedom to leave an abusive employer and 
fostering increased cases of modern slavery.’66 Among other things, the report proposed the drafting of a Modern 
Slavery Act. In preparation for the drafting of this Bill, the Joint Committee on the draft Modern Slavery Bill 
published a report in which it also expressed its disapproval of these visa changes, noting that they ‘have 
unintentionally strengthened the hand of the slave master against the victim of slavery’.67  
 
During the Bill’s readings, Members of Parliament raised the issue of migrant domestic workers, urging the Home 
Secretary to rectify the situation.
68
 A clause was initially tabled and considered during the House of Commons 
Committee stage, reiterating the elements of the 1998 visa. Nevertheless, the clause was rejected both at the 
Committee and Report Stage and was also withdrawn at the House of Lords Committee stage.
69
 Lord Hylton 
subsequently tabled a new amendment under which migrant domestic workers could change employers, as long as 
they notified the Secretary of State of this change.
70
 Regrettably, on 25 March 2015 the House of Lords voted against 
this amendment, leaving the majority of migrant domestic workers outside the remit of the Modern Slavery Act 
2015.
71
 The government announced the launch of an independent inquiry on this issue that was scheduled to report 
its findings by the end of July 2015.
72
 At the time of writing, no such report has been published. 
 
The only relevant provision in the Act relates to migrant domestic workers who have been identified as slavery or 
trafficking victims by the NRM; granting them a six-month visa as domestic workers. While this provision is 
welcome, it is merely an ex post facto solution in a poor attempt to rectify the failings of the immigration regime. As 
Lord Hylton noted, under this provision ‘[…] the worker must first endure a period of abuse and exploitation, then 
escape, and then find the national referral mechanism.’
73
 Accordingly, this provision provides no safeguards for 
domestic workers until a positive NRM decision comes through, a process that, according to the Anti-Trafficking 
Monitoring Group, is in itself flawed and discriminatory.
74
 
 
While the international community has been fighting for the eradication of forced labour, servitude and slavery, the 
UK willfully chose to disregard the visible effects of this visa, and to revert toward a regime closely resembling the 
Kafala. The two systems tie migrant domestic workers to a named employer and dictate that any attempt to change or 
flee will lead to the worker becoming undocumented. The inability to change employers and the finite period of time 
to remain in the destination country create an easily exploitable group with no viable recourse to support or redress. 
These provisions become increasingly unjustifiable when one considers that UK labour law partly excludes domestic 
workers, and where provisions do extend to them, they have proved problematic in enforcement. Inadequate labour 
protections are therefore added to the equation to produce a formula for abuse and exploitation. 
 
Domestic Workers and UK Labour Law  
 
As Taran and Geronimi note, a ‘major incentive for exploitation of migrants and ultimately forced labour is the lack 
of application and enforcement of labour standards in countries of destination as well as origin…’75 One could partly 
attribute non-enforcement of labour standards in domestic work to its link with household tasks that have been 
                                                          
65  Kalayaan, ‘Britain’s Forgotten Slaves’. 
66  Slavery Working Group, ‘It Happens Here: Equipping the United Kingdom to fight modern slavery’, Centre for Social 
Justice, 2013, pp. 92–93. 
67  House of Lords/House of Commons, para. 5. 
68  House of Commons Debate (HC Deb), 8 July 2014, vol. 584, col. 167. 
69  Modern Slavery Bill Debate, 14 October 2014, col. 503; HC Deb, 4 November 2014, vol. 587, col. 780; House of Lords 
Debate (HL Deb), 10 December 2014, vol. 757, col. 1872. 
70  HL Deb, 25 February 2015, vol. 759, col. 1689. 
71  HL Deb, 25 March 2015, vol. 760, col. 1449. 
72  HC Deb, 17 March 2015, vol. 594, col. 681;  
73  Ibid., col. 1432.  
74  (ATMG) Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group, ‘Hidden in Plain Sight: Three years on: Updated analysis of UK measures to 
protect trafficked persons’, ATMG, 2013, p.8.  
75  P Taran and E Geronimi, ‘Globalization, Labor and Migration: Protection is paramount’, International Labour Office, 2002, 
p. 11. 
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traditionally perceived as merely women’s work in the home.76 This perception is reflected in the legislation of many 
countries, which either exclude domestic workers entirely from labour protections or apply labour law selectively to 
them.77 As Mantouvalou notes, the lower protection afforded to domestic workers in the UK represents what she 
refers to as ‘legislative precariousness’.78 This in turn ‘places domestic workers at disadvantage if compared to other 
groups of workers, and reinforces the relationship of submission and subordination that typically characterises the 
employment relation.’79 
Domestic workers in private households, both migrants and non-migrants, are explicitly exempt from a number of 
UK labour regulations. According to Regulation 19 of The Working Time Regulations 1998, the provisions on 
maximum weekly working time and the length of night work do not apply to domestic workers.80 Moreover, they are 
exempt from the right to free health assessment for night workers and from the pattern of work provision ensuring 
that workers are provided with adequate breaks when the work pattern is such as to put their health and safety at 
risk.81 Section 51 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 also excludes domestic servants working in private 
households.82 Even though such workers are in theory entitled to the National Minimum Wage (NMW), they are 
often deprived of this right. A 2011 report found that of the ninety-two employment contracts and letters examined 
and held by the UK Border Agency (now superseded by UKVI), in only twenty was it established that the worker 
was paid at least the minimum wage.83 This deprivation is partly attributed to a legal loophole found in the NMW 
Regulations. Regulation 2 states that the term ‘work’ does not include work relating to the family household of the 
employer that is done by a worker residing in the family home and who, even though not a family member, is treated 
as such, through elements such as the provision of accommodation and meals.84 Even though this may not explicitly 
apply to all live-in domestic workers, it provides employers with leeway to argue that the worker is part of the family, 
in an attempt to avoid liability. Notably, the Court of Appeal has applied this exemption explicitly to domestic 
workers.85  
Some labour law provisions available to other workers do extend to domestic workers. For example, unless the 
employer is related to the domestic worker, the latter is in theory entitled to the statutory provisions relating to 
redundancy payments.86 Furthermore, such workers have the right to paid holiday, statutory sick pay and statutory 
maternity leave.87 Yet, the hidden nature of this employment makes the enforcement of such rights challenging. As 
noted, these workers are excluded from the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 that, among other provisions, 
includes a provision for labour inspections.88 Therefore, authorities cannot easily ensure that these labour provisions 
are respected. 
 
Workers entering a country under tied visas find themselves in an even more disadvantageous position. Dependence 
on employers for accommodation, food and legal status leaves workers with limited bargaining power, preventing 
them from demanding respect of their labour rights. Additionally, the limited period for which they are allowed to 
remain in the UK also prevents them from enforcing their rights. While raising employment claims has always been 
challenging, due to the private environment of the work and the relationship between the parties, the current system 
hinders such claims even further. It is very unlikely that within the six months prescribed, the worker will find the 
courage to report the abuse, as well as commence and conclude legal action brought against the employer. While 
workers could potentially apply for a special residence permit that would enable them to remain for the duration of 
the proceedings, such a permit is often refused.  
 
                                                          
76  ILO, ‘Report IV(1)’, p. 1. 
77  For a comparison between the Domestic Workers Convention provisions and national labour laws, see Thomson Reuters 
Foundation for the Trust Women Conference. 
78  V Mantouvalou, ‘Human Rights For Precarious Workers’, p.137. 
79  Ibid. 
80  Contrary to the UK, Kuwait, a Kafala-supportive state, which for years has reportedly neglected the rights of migrant domestic 
workers, passed on 24 June 2015 new legislation granting domestic workers enforceable labour rights, including the right to a 
national minimum wage, maximum working hours and rest days. See: HRW, ‘Kuwait: New law a breakthrough for domestic 
workers’, HRW, 2015, retrieved 1 July 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/30/kuwait-new-law-breakthrough-
domestic-workers 
81  HM Government, Working Time Regulations 1998, SI 1998/1833, reg. 19. 
82  HM Government, Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, c. 37, s. 51.  
83  N Clarke and L Kumarappan, ‘Turning a Blind Eye: The British state and migrant domestic workers’ employment rights’, 
Working Lives Research Institute, 2011, p. 2, retrieved 25 January 2015, 
http://workinglives.org/fms/MRSite/Research/wlri/WORKS/TaBE%20final%20report.pdf  
84  HM Government, National Minimum Wage Regulations 1999, SI 1999/584, reg. 2 (2) (a) (i), (ii). 
85  Nambalat v. Taher & Anor: Udin v. Pasha & Ors [2012] EWCA Civ 1249. 
86  HM Government, Employment Rights Act 1996, c.18, s.161. 
87  HM Government, Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992.  
88  Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, s.51. 
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Conclusion: The way forward 
 
Current UK labour laws are in clear contradiction with the spirit of the Domestic Workers Convention. Not only do 
the existing limited labour protections and the inability of domestic workers to seek legal redress become an 
incentive for exploitation, but they also reinforce gender disparities in relation to access to decent work. Since, the 
majority of domestic workers are women, poor working conditions and limited protections evidenced 
disproportionately affect them.89 Therefore, not only is the need for adequate labour protections important for 
ensuring that this labour force is protected and able to realise their rights, but it is also vital for promoting gender 
equality. The UK must therefore ratify the Domestic Workers Convention to ensure, at a minimum, that labour 
rights commonly afforded to other workers, and to a great extent male workers,90 are extended to domestic workers 
who are in the majority women. 
 
The UK ratification of the Domestic Workers Convention is a vital step towards the protection of migrant domestic 
workers. Nevertheless, despite the obligation on states, as set out in Article 17, to implement a labour inspection 
mechanism for domestic workers, in practice this may not be adequate to protect workers. The article’s wording 
itself seems tentative, noting that such a mechanism shall be implemented ‘with due regard for the special 
characteristics of domestic work, in accordance with national laws and regulations’.91 Accordingly, this gives states 
discretion in the way in which they comply with the provision and justifies the retention of existing ineffective 
national labour inspection mechanisms. Indeed, even though a number of countries now allow such inspections to 
take place, they do so under certain conditions, such as obtaining the permission of the homeowner. 92  Such 
conditions are self-defeating as they place overt control in the hands of the employer, comparable to the current UK 
immigration regime.  
 
It is therefore imperative for the UK to take further preventative steps to eradicate the risk of exploitation. To do so, 
the current immigration regime for migrant domestic workers must be abolished. Regrettably, parliament failed to 
achieve this through the inclusion of a clause in the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and it remains to be seen whether the 
government will put the proposed immigration changes before Parliament. In any event, anything less than a return 
to the 1998 visa will not suffice in protecting migrant domestic workers from exploitation. 
Importantly, while reverting to the 1998 visa will undoubtedly equip workers with bargaining power and the potential 
to leave an exploitative relationship, the new visa should go further and set out a number of requirements that UKVI 
should ask from employers. One such recommendation, proposed by the Working Lives Research Institute is for 
UKVI to require more detailed contracts and pay slips from employers.93 This is a means of checking whether the 
remuneration received is both according to the initial contract and above the NMW. Furthermore, UKVI needs to 
become more active in enquiring into alleged abuse reported by migrant domestic workers and notifying the 
appropriate authorities. Research showed that it had in its possession details of abuse provided by workers when 
changing employers, yet no evidence was found that it had acted upon this information. Finally, UKVI must ensure 
that, when applying for a visa, domestic workers are informed of their rights and of how to obtain assistance while in 
the UK. Currently, as noted, authorities do not often comply with this obligation. 
The international community is witnessing both a movement towards decent work for domestic workers, as well as 
an effort for the eradication of human trafficking, forced labour, servitude and slavery. The UK must therefore 
ensure that both its labour and immigration provisions promote these ideals, rather than facilitate and enhance the 
exploitation of migrant domestic workers.  
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